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Capital reallocation creates excess volatility in investment in many two-country open 
economy models. Convex adjustment costs to capital have become a standard tool to 
deal with this. However, current microeconomic investment models feature non-convex 
adjustment costs as the dominant friction. This paper analyzes ﬁxed costs to capital 
adjustment in a two-country business cycle model and ﬁnds that ﬁxed costs – unlike in 
closed economies – dampen aggregate investment volatilities. Moreover, convex adjustment 
costs can serve as a stand-in for these ﬁxed adjustment costs when one is interested in 
aggregate dynamics only. Yet, the mapping between ﬁxed and quadratic adjustment costs 
co-depends on other model parameters.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Since Backus et al. (1992) adapted the real business cycle model to the context of international economics, it has been 
well known that, unlike its closed economy counterpart, the open economy real business cycle model suffers from excess 
volatility in investment driven by capital reallocation across countries. The introduction of trade in intermediate goods as 
in Backus et al. (1994) tends to mitigate the effect, but this depends crucially on parameter values and model assumptions. 
An ample range of applications remains in which the assumption of unobstructed, frictionless capital ﬂows across borders 
implies an investment volatility relative to output far in excess of what is consistent with the data.1 As ﬁrst demonstrated 
by Baxter and Crucini (1993), the model’s ﬁt can be signiﬁcantly improved by the introduction of convex adjustment costs 
to capital at the national level. Over time, this has become a standard practice.
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activities. This research ﬁrst argued that non-convex instead of convex adjustment costs are the dominant friction to capital 
adjustment at the plant or ﬁrm level (see e.g. Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006)2 but then also found that non-convex costs 
have little to no aggregate impact (in closed economy DSGE models); see, e.g., Khan and Thomas (2008).
These two ﬁndings seem to challenge the above-mentioned open economy modeling practice, but in fact they do not. 
We ﬁnd that the Khan and Thomas (2008) result generalizes to the open economy set-up not as an “irrelevance” result 
but in the following sense: First, approximate aggregation3 also holds as in Khan and Thomas (2008) in the open economy 
model with non-convex adjustment costs, such that we can describe the evolution of aggregates in the economy based 
only on aggregate economic variables.4 Second, ﬁxed adjustment costs dampen aggregate investment. And, third, the laws 
of motion that govern the evolution of aggregate variables coincide with the aggregate laws of motion generated by a 
representative-ﬁrm model with convex adjustment costs. Hence, the representative agent model can be viewed as a handy 
stand-in for describing macro dynamics.
However, this does not immediately imply that one can without doubt estimate and then use convex-cost models for 
policy analysis despite the dominant micro friction being non-convex costs. The Lucas critique might challenge policy pre-
dictions if the implied convex adjustment cost parameters co-depend on non-adjustment cost parameters of the model. 
In fact, while we ﬁnd that ﬁxed adjustment costs change aggregate investment dynamics indistinguishably from quadratic 
adjustment costs, we also ﬁnd that the so identiﬁed quadratic costs change when non-adjustment cost parameters change, 
i.e., quadratic costs lack “fundamentalness”.5 To assess this, we construct matches between convex and non-convex adjust-
ment costs varying other model parameters. In particular we vary openness to trade, idiosyncratic proﬁtability risk, and the 
returns-to-scale (characterizing the mark-up ﬁrms can charge). The link between the two cost speciﬁcations is not stable 
with respect to these variations. It is particularly unstable to variations in parameters that directly enter the ﬁrm’s trade-off 
between investment and non-adjustment, i.e., the mark-up and the idiosyncratic risk.
Why do we think the Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) result generalizes in this way? Khan and Thomas studied a one-
sector closed economy set-up with heterogeneous ﬁrms that face ﬁxed adjustment costs and found that these costs are 
entirely irrelevant for aggregate dynamics. In their closed economy general equilibrium model, this irrelevance result arises 
because the household’s desire to smooth consumption does not allow for much variation in savings behavior. This yields 
the result that small additional changes in the interest rate undo all potential aggregate effects of microeconomic lumpiness 
in a closed economy because individual investment timing is very sensitive to interest rate movements notwithstanding the 
ﬁxed adjustment costs (see House, 2008), while savings are not. In an open economy setting, domestic savings are not the 
only means to ﬁnance investment and consumption smoothing can also be achieved via movements in the current account. 
This dampens interest rate responses which leaves room for ﬁxed adjustment costs to matter. The effect is the stronger, 
the more open an economy is to trade (i.e., the smaller its home bias in consumption), such that the Khan and Thomas 
(2003, 2008) result also obtains when letting our model converge toward a model of two separate closed economies or 
when looking at two economies with perfectly correlated productivity shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews a number of related recent contributions to the 
literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 brieﬂy introduces the numerical solution method. Section 5 explains 
parameter choices. Section 6 presents our main results: ﬁxed adjustment costs matter but aggregate dynamics are indis-
tinguishable from a representative-ﬁrm model with quadratic adjustment costs. Section 7 discusses how stand-in quadratic 
adjustment costs co-depend on other model parameters. Finally, Section 8 concludes. Appendices A–E provide more details 
on results, the calibration of ﬁxed adjustment costs, and the numerical solution procedure.
2. Further related literature
A number of other recent papers have shown applications in which the non-convexity of plant-level decisions does 
matter in shaping aggregate dynamics. Bachmann et al. (2013) show that lumpiness in capital adjustment decisions help 
explain the procyclicality of the aggregate investment response to TFP shocks in US data. Fiori (2012) introduces a two-sector 
RBC model in which non-convex capital adjustment costs in the investment goods producing sector allow the model to 
replicate a hump-shaped response of aggregate investment to productivity shocks. Given that a two-country model can 
2 Convex costs as dominant investment friction would have diﬃculties in generating the close to zero serial correlation of plant-level investment rates 
(see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) and their skewness and kurtosis, which exceeds signiﬁcantly that of ﬁrm-level proﬁtability (see Bachmann and Bayer, 
2013, 2014). Early studies arguing for the role of non-convex adjustment costs using US data include e.g., Caballero et al. (1995), Doms and Dunne (1998), 
Caballero and Engel (1999) and Cooper et al. (1999) or Gourio and Kashyap (2007).
3 See Krusell and Smith (1998).
4 Approximate aggregation for models with heterogeneous ﬁrms and ﬁxed costs of adjustment have been found in numerous studies and for a broad 
range of parameters starting with Khan and Thomas (2003). Further examples are Gourio and Kashyap (2007) and Khan and Thomas (2008), or Bachmann 
et al. (2013). In models with uncertainty shocks, such as Bachmann and Bayer (2014), strictly speaking, approximate aggregation breaks down since the 
“dispersion” of productivity also needs to be taken into account.
5 The latter point is closely related to the one made for heterogeneous household models by Chang et al. (2010), who have recently argued for more 
caution when aggregating over ex post heterogeneous micro units in the presence of frictions. They look at an incomplete-markets, heterogeneous house-
hold set-up, and show that the estimated parameters of homogeneous agent models in these settings can often lack “fundamentalness” in the sense of the 
Lucas critique.
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costs in inter-sectoral reallocation. Bachmann and Ma (2012) solve a closed economy model in which aggregate savings 
can also take the form of inventory accumulation. They show that a ﬁxed cost to restocking inventories and ﬁxed capital 
adjustment costs have mutually reinforcing effects on aggregate dynamics. In Sustek (2011) plants face non-convex costs to 
using different forms of shift work. In consequence, output volatility is reduced and becomes countercyclical. Most similar 
in spirit to our work is a paper by Miao and Wang (2011), developed in parallel, which derives conditions under which 
the aggregate dynamics in a model where ﬁrms face both ﬁx and convex capital adjustment costs can be represented by 
a model where only convex costs are present and Tobin’s Q is a suﬃcient statistic for describing investment dynamics. 
Their paper demonstrates that the form of the convex cost function in the isomorphic representation depends on the size 
of the non-convex adjustment costs. In contrast to our approach, Miao and Wang (2011) assume constant returns to scale 
in production at the micro level and then use convex capital adjustment costs alongside ﬁxed ones to avoid a degenerated 
ﬁrm problem. By dropping the constant returns to scale assumption, we show that the curvature of the production function 
and the distribution of idiosyncratic proﬁtabilities enters in the convex cost representation.
3. The model
We model a world economy composed of two countries Home and Foreign (where necessary, country-speciﬁc variables 
will be distinguished by the superscripts, H and F respectively). Each country is populated by a representative household 
and a continuum of ﬁrms producing an intermediate good that differs between the two countries. Competitive ﬁnal goods 
producers use these inputs to produce a local composite good used for investment and consumption. There exists a complete 
set of contingent claims, which ensures international consumption risk sharing. The challenge in solving the model lies in 
the solution of the intermediate goods producers’ problem in both countries. Here, we closely follow Khan and Thomas
(2008) and can therefore be brief in referring the reader to that paper for further explanations. We will focus instead on 
the necessary adaptations to the solution method for it to be applicable to our model.
3.1. Households
There is a continuum of identical households in both economies who work and consume and who have access to com-
plete international asset markets. Their felicity function is deﬁned on the consumption of their local consumption good and 
in (indivisible) labor, which they supply on the local labor market:
U (C j,N j) = log(C j) − AN j, (1)
where C j is consumption in country j and N j is the households’ labor supply in country j.
Households hold wealth as one-period shares in plants denoted by the measure λ j . Given the prices they receive for 
their current shares ρ j0
(
, l; zˆ,m) and the real wage rate W j/PCj , households choose current consumption C j , labor effort 
N j and the number of new shares λ′j (,k) to buy at prices ρ
j
1
(
′,k′; zˆ,m). (zˆ,m) summarizes the aggregate state and is 
deﬁned further below. Households maximize the expected discounted present value of intertemporal utility:
W
(
λ j; zˆ,m
)= max
C j ,N j ,λ′
[
U
(
C j,N j
)+ βE [W (λ′; zˆ′,m′)]]
subject to
C j +
∫
ρ
j
1
(
′,k′; zˆ,m)d (′ × k′)≤ W j/PCj +
∫
ρ
j
0
(
,k; zˆ,m)d ( × k)
Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier on the households’ intertemporal budget constraint. We obtain the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions with respect to consumption
λPCj = UC (C j,N j) =
1
C j
, (2)
where PCj is the current price of the ﬁnal consumption good in country j. With respect to labor we obtain
λW j = −UN(C j,N j) (3)
where W j is the nominal wage in country j. Combining this with the ﬁrst-order condition on consumption and plugging in 
the assumed functional forms, we obtain
W j/P
C
j = AC j.
Note that with complete international ﬁnancial markets the resulting allocation must be eﬃcient. This, together with the 
assumption of symmetric initial endowments, implies equal Pareto weights and hence the risk-sharing condition UC (CF ,NF )
PCF
=
UC (CH ,NH )
C .PH
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In both countries, consumption and investment use a composite good produced by a competitive ﬁnal goods producer. 
The ﬁnal goods producer in country j combines intermediate goods XH,Fj , where X
H
j (X
F
j ) are intermediate goods produced 
in the Home (Foreign) country and used in country j. Final consumption goods in country j are produced using the constant 
returns to scale production function:
G j(X
H
j , X
F
j ) =
[
ω
1
σ X jj
σ−1
σ + (1− ω) 1σ X¬ jj
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, j = H, F ,
where ω measures the home-bias or importance of local intermediate goods for the ﬁnal goods production, and ¬ j denotes 
the respective other country.
Final goods markets are competitive. Let P Xj be the price of the intermediate good produced in country j. Then ﬁnal 
goods producers solve the cost minimization problem:
min
XHj ,X
F
j
P XH X
H
j + P XF X Fj (4)
s.t.
G j(X
H
j , X
F
j ) = 1
This cost minimization and perfect competition imply that the price of the consumption good PCj in country j is given by
PCj =
[
ω
(
P Xj
)1−σ + (1− ω)(P X¬ j)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
.
Using the Home country intermediate good as a numeraire and normalizing P XH to one we obtain as prices for the ﬁnal 
consumption good:
PCH (τ ) = [ω + (1− ω)τ 1−σ ]
1
1−σ
PCF (τ ) = [ωτ 1−σ + (1− ω)]
1
1−σ = τ PCH
(
τ−1
)
where τ = P XF
P XH
denotes the terms of trade.
3.3. Intermediate goods producers
The more complicated planning problem is the one of the intermediate goods producer. In both countries, intermediate 
goods producers employ predetermined capital and labor and produce according to a Cobb–Douglas decreasing-returns-to-
scale production function
y = z(kχn1−χ ) 1η
where z is stochastic total factor productivity common to all ﬁrms in the country and  is ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. A way 
of reading the decreasing returns-to-scale assumption is as constant returns-to-scale in production with capital share χ cum
monopolistic competition in intermediate goods, where ﬁrms earn a mark-up of η on their sales. This implies revenue 
elasticities of capital θ = 1ηχ and ν = 1η (1 − χ) of labor.
We assume that Home and Foreign technology follow the joint process[
log
(
zH,t
)
log
(
zF ,t
) ]= [ρ1 ρ2
ρ2 ρ1
][
log
(
zH,t
)
log
(
zF ,t
) ]+ [ν1
ν2
]
, with
[
ν1
ν2
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ 2ν cov
cov σ 2ν
])
(5)
As in Backus et al. (1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2002), technology spillovers are assumed to be symmetric with 
ρ1, ρ2 > 0, so are the variances of shocks σ 2ν . Since our study focuses on the excess volatility of the investment series 
in national economies caused by international capital reallocation in response to productivity differentials between the two 
countries, and to facilitate the analysis, we rewrite the productivity process as a world TFP component and a deviation 
thereof by premultiplying H = √2−1
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, such that log
(
zˆt
)= H log (zt) only. zˆt follows an AR(1) process
log zˆt =
[
ρˆ1 0
0 ρˆ
]
log zˆt−1 + υˆ with υˆ ∼ N
(
0,
[
σˆ 2νworld 0
0 σˆ 2
])
,2 νdiff
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ρˆ1 = ρ1 + ρ2, ρˆ2 = ρ1 − ρ2, σˆ 2νworld = 2σ 2ν + 2cov, and σˆ 2νdiff = 2σ 2ν − 2cov.
Then zHt =
√
zˆ1,t zˆ2,t and zFt =
√
zˆ1,t/zˆ2,t and we discretize zˆt into a 9 × 9-state Markov process using the Rouwenhorst 
method as described in Kopecky and Suen (2010).6 The idiosyncratic proﬁtability process follows a 15-state Markov process, 
which is an approximation to a continuous AR(1) process for log proﬁtability with innovations exhibiting slight excess 
kurtosis as in Bachmann and Bayer (2014).7
Each ﬁrm produces an intermediate good but needs to raise capital in terms of the national composite good. At the 
beginning of a period, a ﬁrm receives an idiosyncratic i.i.d. ﬁxed adjustment cost draw ξ ≥ 0, which is denominated in units 
of labor. It is drawn from a distribution G : [0, ¯ξ ] → [0, 1]. This distribution is common to all ﬁrms:
G ∼ U (0, ξ¯ )
We initially denote the ﬁrm’s planning problem in units of the local capital-consumption good. The intra-period timing 
is as follows: After having observed innovations to aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity and its adjustment cost draw, 
the ﬁrm optimally adjusts labor, produces output and harvests ﬂow proﬁts. The ﬁrm then decides whether to pay the 
adjustment cost and adjust its capital stock to the current target level or whether to exercise its option to wait and see 
and let its capital depreciate. Upon investment, the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost of wξ , where w is the current real wage rate 
deﬁned in local intermediate goods w j := W j/P Xj . Capital depreciates at rate δ. We can then summarize the evolution of 
the ﬁrm’s capital stock (in eﬃciency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k′ as follows:
Fixed cost paid γ k′
i 	= 0 wξ (1− δ)k + i
i = 0 0 (1− δ)k
The distributions of ﬁrms over capital and idiosyncratic productivity states (, k) in the two countries are summarized 
using the probability measures μH and μF . They are suﬃcient to describe differences between ﬁrms and their evolution 
over time given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs. Deﬁne m ≡ [μH (k, ), μF (k, )] so that the aggregate state of the 
economy is described by (zˆ, m). The distributions evolve over time according to a mapping  from the current aggregate 
state m′ = (zˆ, m) which will be deﬁned below.
Let v j(, k, ξ ; ˆz, m) denote the expected discounted value – measured in local consumption goods – of a ﬁrm in country 
j that is in an idiosyncratic state (, k, ξ), given the aggregate state (zˆ, m). Its expected value prior to drawing its adjustment 
cost draw is then given by:
v¯ j(,k; zˆ,m) =
ξ∫
0
v j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m)G(dξ) (6)
The dynamic programming problem of a ﬁrm in country j is described by:
v(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m) j = cf j +max
{
vdepj ,maxk
′ (−ac j + vadjj )} , (7)
where cf are ﬂow proﬁts, vdepj is the ﬁrm’s continuation value if it chooses inaction and lets its capital depreciate, and v
adj
j
is the continuation value, net of adjustment costs, if the ﬁrm chooses to invest and adjust its capital stock to the current 
target level. These functions are given by:
cf j = maxn
[
z j(kχn1−χ )
1
η − w j(zˆ,m)n
] P Xj
P Cj
(8a)
vdepj = E
[
d j
(
zˆ′,m′
)
v¯
(
′, (1− δ)
γ
k; zˆ′,m′
)]
(8b)
ac j = ξw j(zˆ,m)
P Xj
P Cj
(8c)
vadjj = −i +E
[
d j
(
zˆ′,m′
)
v¯
(
′,k′; zˆ′,m′)] (8d)
6 The MATLAB code for the discretization procedure is available on Karen Kopecky’s website at www.karenkopecky.net.
7 We model the distribution of idiosyncratic proﬁtability shocks as a mixture of two Gaussian distributions with a standard deviation of 0.09 ± 0.03 and 
a weight of 0.41 on the one with the larger standard deviation.
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states, conditional on this period’s values, and we recall that i = γ k′ − (1 − δ)k. The stochastic discount factor of the local 
representative household is
d j
(
zˆ′,m′
)= β UC
[
C j
(
zˆ′,m′
)
,N j
(
zˆ′,m′
)]
UC
[
C j
(
zˆ,m
)
,N j
(
zˆ,m
)] .
We can eliminate the stochastic discount factor by rephrasing the ﬁrm’s value function in terms of utils (more details 
can be found in Khan and Thomas, 2008). This allows us to compute equilibrium by solving a single Bellman equation that 
combines the plant-level optimization problem in Eqs. (6)–(8) with the households’ ﬁrst-order conditions (2)–(3). Given 
that investment uses the composite consumption good, we deﬁne its price relative to the ﬁrm’s output as (P XH has been 
normalized to one):
q j(τ ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
PCH
P XH
= PCH (τ ) for j = H,
PCF
P XF
= PCFτ = PCH
(
τ−1
)
for j = F.
(9)
Denoting the marginal utility of consumption by  j ≡ U jC (C j, Ni), we obtain due to eﬃcient risk-sharing between the 
economies:
 j (τ ,CH ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
UHC for j = H
U FC
P XF
PCF
qF (τ ) = H (τ ,CH ) P
X
F
PCH
qF (τ ) = H (τ ,CH )τ qF (τ )qH (τ ) for j = F
(10)
UHC is the marginal utility of consumption in the Home economy. Importantly, we can express the marginal utility of the 
foreign household as a function of home marginal utility and terms of trade.
Let V j(, k, ξ ; ˆz, m) = v jU jC (Ci, Ni) now denote the expected discounted value in utils of the respective representative 
household of a ﬁrm. This is:
V j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m) = C F j +max
{
V depj ,maxk′
(
−AC j + V adjj
)}
, j = H, F (11)
with the components deﬁned analogously to before. These are given by:
C F j = max
n
[
z j
(
zˆ
)
(kχn1−χ )
1
η − w j(zˆ,m)n
] j(τ ,CH )
q j(τ )
(12a)
V depj = βE
[
V¯ j
(
′, 1− δ
γ
k; zˆ′,m′ )] (12b)
AC j = ξw j(zˆ,m) j(τ ,CH )
q j(τ )
(12c)
V adjj = −i j(τ ,CH ) + βE
[
V¯ j(
′,k′; zˆ′,m′)] (12d)
V¯ j(,k; zˆ,m) =
ξ∫
0
V j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m)G(dξ). (12e)
Given (, k, ξ) and equilibrium prices w j(zˆ, m),  j
[
τ (zˆ,m),CH (zˆ,m)
]
and q 
[
τ (zˆ,m)
]
the plant chooses employment and 
whether to invest or let its capital depreciate.8 Denote as N j = N(, k; ˆz, m), K j = K (, k, ξ ; ˆz, m) the intermediate ﬁrm 
policy functions. Since capital is predetermined, the optimal employment decision is independent of the current adjustment 
cost draws. We denote the total intermediate goods output in country j by Y j .
3.4. Recursive equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is completely described by the set:
{w j,H , τ , V j,NDj ,NSj , K j,C j, XHj , X Fj ,} j=H,F
that satisﬁes
8 NB: the problem is symmetric for both countries, which can be exploited to save computation time.
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2. Household optimality: Taking w , τ and H as given, the households’ consumption C j and labor supply NSj satisfy (2)
and (3).
3. XHj , X
F
j solve (4).
4. Labor markets clearing:
NSj (zˆ,m) =
∫ {
NDj (,k; zˆ,m) +
∫
ξI
[
1− δ
γ
k − K j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m)
]
dG
}
dμ j
where I(x) = 0 if x = 0; I(x) = 1 otherwise.
5. Final goods markets clearing:
C j +
∫ ξ∫
0
[
γ K j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m) − (1− δ)k
]
dGdμH = G j(XHj , X Fj )
6. Intermediate goods markets clearing:
∑
l=H,F
X jl = Y j
7. Model consistent dynamics: The evolution of the cross-sectional distributions that characterize the economy in both coun-
tries, m′ = (zˆ, m), is induced by {K j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,m)} j=H,F and the exogenous processes for zˆ and  .
4. Numerical solution
The aggregate state contains two inﬁnite dimensional objects: the distributions of intermediate producers in both coun-
tries over capital and idiosyncratic productivity states. Following Krusell and Smith (1998, 1997) we approximate those 
distributions by a ﬁnite number of distributional moments. Let mˆ = [kH ,kF ] denote our approximate aggregate state and 
ˆ(mˆ, ˆz) denote its law of motion, such that mˆ′ = ˆ(mˆ, ˆz). In our applications, ﬁrst moments over capital, kH and kF turn out 
to contain suﬃcient information to accurately forecast prices. The equilibrium forecasting rules and accuracy tests including 
R2s are reported in the numerical appendix. We specify simple log-linear rules to describe price forecasts for  and τ and 
the evolution of capital stocks ˆ. Instead of laws of motion for log(kH ) and log(kF ), we work with a rotated version of the 
system in the sum of log-world capital and its difference.9
We impose some economic structure to minimize the effect of simulation and estimation uncertainty inherent in a 
Monte-Carlo method such as Krusell and Smith’s (1998) algorithm (see den Haan, 1997). For this reason, exploiting symme-
try, we assume that world capital depends only on previous world capital (and not on its distribution over countries) and 
world TFP. The difference in capital stocks between countries depends only on previous differences in capital and TFP and 
not on world capital stocks or world TFP. Moreover, we impose log-linear effects of aggregate productivity on the dynamics 
of capital stocks as well as prices10:
9 One may obtain the speciﬁcation below by pre-multiplying the system:
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αH0
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αHk,1 α
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]
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log
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with the matrix 
[
1 1
1 −1
]
. Symmetry of Home and Foreign country implies that αH0 = αF0 , αHk,1 = αFk,2, αFk,1 = αHk,2, αHz,1 = αFz,1 and αHz,2 = −αFz,2. It follows 
that
αw0 = 2αH0 α0 = 0
αwk = αHk,1 + αFk,1 = αHk,2 + αFk,2 αk = αHk,1 − αFk,1 = αHk,2 − αFk,2
αwz = αHz1 + αFz1 = 2αHz1 αz1 = αHz1 − αFz1 = 0
αwz2 = αHz2 + αFz2 = 0 αz = αHz2 − αFz2 = 2αHz2
10 We checked whether these restrictions we imposed actually restrict the dynamics, by estimating versions without the imposed restrictions and check 
whether the restrictions would be rejected by a Wald test. We found that the imposed restrictions would not be rejected in equilibrium.
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log(kH ) + log(kF )
]′ = αw0 + αwk [log(kH ) + log(2F )]+ αwz log(zˆ1) (13a)[
log(kH ) − log(kF )
]′ = αk [log(kH ) − log(kF )]+ αz log(zˆ2) (13b)
log(H ) = α0 + α1 log(kH ) + α2 log(kF ) + α3 log(zˆ1) + α4 log(zˆ2) (13c)
log(τ ) = ατ1
[
log(kH ) − log(kF )
]+ ατ2 log(zˆ1) + ατ3 log(zˆ2). (13d)
The solution algorithm consists of two steps that we repeat until parameters of the aggregate laws of motion converge. 
Using an initial guess for the parameters of the aggregate laws, we solve the dynamic programming problem posed by 
Eqs. (11)–(12e), which becomes computationally feasible once the approximate aggregate state is used. A number of the 
problem’s features facilitate the solution considerably. First, the ﬁrms’ employment decision is static and independent of its 
investment adjustment cost draw so that it can be maximized out using the respective ﬁrst-order condition:
N(,k; zˆ,mˆ) =
( w
zˆνkθ
) 1
ν−1
Second, the optimal capital stock chosen conditional on adjustment is independent of the ﬁrm’s current individual capital 
stock. This optimization problem therefore needs to be solved only once for each point on the aggregate state grid. Given 
that adjustment is costly and that it always holds that V adjj (; ˆz, mˆ) ≥ V depj (k, ; ˆz, mˆ), the value of the adjustment cost draw, 
ξˆ (, k; ˆz, mˆ), at which the ﬁrm is just indifferent between adjusting and exercising its option to wait and see (i.e., letting its 
capital depreciate) is given by:
ξˆ j(,k; zˆ,mˆ) =
q j
[
τ (zˆ,mˆ)
] [
V adjj (; zˆ,mˆ) − V depj (k, ; zˆ,mˆ)
]
 j(zˆ,mˆ)w
[
τ (zˆ,mˆ)
] (14)
Denoting the target capital stock to which a ﬁrm with idiosyncratic productivity  in country j adjusts in the absence of 
frictions by k∗j (; ˆz, mˆ) allows us to compute the ﬁrms’ second policy function determining investment:
k′ = K j(,k, ξ ; zˆ,mˆ) =
{
k∗j (; zˆ,mˆ) if ξ ≤ ξˆ j(,k; zˆ,mˆ),
(1− δ)k/γ otherwise. (15)
Given ﬁrm policy functions, we simulate the economy in the second step. In order to more eﬃciently exploit parallel 
computing resources, instead of using one long draw of relative productivities, we generate observations for aggregate 
variables using several shorter draws of zˆt . During the simulation, market clearing values of  and τ are computed exactly. 
This procedure generates a total of T = 4900 observations of {mˆt , t, τt}, which we use then to update the α-coeﬃcients in 
the aggregate laws of motion by simple OLS regression. We iterate these steps until an F-test ﬁnds all parameter estimates 
from two successive steps statistically indistinguishable. Upon convergence, we have obtained the Krusell–Smith recursive 
equilibrium of our economy for a given set of parameters.
5. Parameter choices
The model parameters to calibrate are relatively standard. They involve the discount factor, β , the disutility of labor, A, 
the parameters of the production function, χ and η, the law of motion for aggregate productivity, the substitution elasticity 
in ﬁnal goods production, σ , as well as the home bias parameter, ω. The parameters somewhat less standard are of the 
idiosyncratic productivity process, ρ and σ , and the adjustment cost parameter ξ¯ . We use the data and calibration strategy 
from Bachmann and Bayer (2014) to identify these parameters.
5.1. Open economy parameters
The substitution elasticity, σ , between intermediate input goods in the production function for the ﬁnal consumption 
goods is set to 1.5. A common range in the open economy literature is [1,2]. A recent estimate for the bilateral productivity 
process comes from Heathcote and Perri (2002), who use data for the US and the rest of the world as the other economy. 
Their estimates imply values for our process of log-relative TFP of ρˆ2 = 0.7975 and σˆ 2νdiff = 0.0167 and for the world TFP 
process ρˆ1 = 0.9801 and σˆ 2νworld = 0.0234. For our baseline, we set ω = 0.7, which is about average for OECD countries.
5.2. Parameters for the national economies
The model period is a year, in line with the ﬁrm-level investment data. Again following the calibration in Bachmann and 
Bayer (2014), we therefore set β = 0.97, in line with an annual interest rate of 4.6% (and a trend growth of 1.4%). We set 
A = 1.86 to match a steady-state labor supply of 1/3.
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Parameters of the baseline calibration.
Preferences
HH discount rate β = 0.97
Disutility of labor A = 1.8604
Firm production
Output elasticity of capital χ = 1/3
Mark-up in intermediate goods markets η = 4/3
Implied labor revenue elasticity ν = 1/2
Implied capital revenue elasticity θ = 1/4
Rate of technological progress γ = 1.014
Depreciation rate δ = 0.094
Persistence in id. prod. ρ = 0.9675
Std. of innovations to id. prod. σ = 0.0905
Open economy
EOS in composite good σ = 1.5
Persistence in sum of TFP ρ1 = 0.9801
Variance of innovations to sum of TFP σ 2υworld = 0.0234
Persistence in TFP-difference ρ2 = 0.7975
Variance of innovations to TFP-difference σ 2υdiff = 0.0167
Import share in consumption 1− ω = 0.3
We set the coeﬃcients of the revenue function χ = 1/3 and η = 4/3, which implies a mark-up of 33% and the implied 
output elasticities of labor and capital are ν = 1/2 and θ = 1/4 respectively, as in Bloom (2009). This is also close to the 
empirical estimate in Bachmann and Bayer (2014) for manufacturing. We calibrate γ to imply a technological growth rate 
of 1.4% per annum and depreciation to 9.4% per annum and assume for idiosyncratic productivity
log′ = ρ log + σu (16)
where u comes from a mixture of two normals to capture the slight excess kurtosis in proﬁtability shocks reported in 
Bachmann and Bayer (2014) and set ρ = 0.9675 and σ = 0.0905 again in line with Bachmann and Bayer (2014), who 
report annual cross-sectional ﬁrm-level data from Germany.
Our baseline speciﬁcation of ξ = 0.2 minimizes the precision weighted distance to the cross-sectional skewness and 
kurtosis in annual plant investment rates reported in Bachmann and Bayer (2014) and also roughly matches the frac-
tion of spike-adjusters (10% vis-a-vis 13%) they report for manufacturing. This estimate is well in line with estimates by 
Bachmann et al. (2013), Caballero and Engel (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), or Bloom (2009). The implied av-
erage resources spent on adjustment show that roughly 16% of a ﬁrm’s annual labor force is used for installing capital, 
which is in line with the estimates cited above (see Table 3 in Bachmann et al., 2013). Table 1 summarizes our parameter 
choices.
6. Results
6.1. Main results
Our main results are summarized in Table 2: The frictionless model generates too much investment volatility and (as we 
will show later) this excess volatility mostly comes from capital reallocation. The ﬁxed adjustment cost model, calibrated 
to the cross-sectional properties of investment, substantially decreases the investment volatility by roughly 10% and aligns 
the model better with the data in this respect. The third column shows that a quadratic-adjustment-cost model, in which 
the adjustment costs of capital are given by φ2 wt
(
kt+1−kt
kt
)2
,11 yields fairly similar aggregate business cycle statistics, when 
φ = 0.155.
We obtain this parameter value by minimizing the relative quadratic distance in the log-linear aggregate state represen-
tation of the quadratic costs and the ﬁxed costs model:
min
φ

(
φ, ξ¯
)= min
φ
1
4
√√√√√ ∑
x∈{,w}
∑
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[
α
x,ﬁxed
i
(
ξ¯
)− αx,quad.i (φ)
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x,ﬁxed
i
(
ξ¯
)
]2
. (17)
11 We chose capital adjustment costs to be labor denominated to keep as close as possible to the baseline ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation. We also experimented 
with output denominated costs. This did not qualitatively alter results. Quantitatively, calibrated quadratic adjustment costs did not change much either.
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Cyclical properties.
Data Frictionless model Non-convex cost model Quadratic cost model
Standard deviations in %
GDP 1.96 1.50 1.47 1.47
Standard deviation relative to GDP
Investment 2.82 3.56 3.25 3.25
Consumption 1.03 0.61 0.62 0.62
Employment 0.72 0.48 0.45 0.46
Exports 2.25 1.03 1.01 1.01
Imports 3.02 1.03 1.01 1.01
NX 0.50 0.24 0.20 0.19
ToTs 2.08 0.81 0.82 0.82
Correlation with GDP
Investment 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.88
Consumption 0.82 0.94 0.95 0.95
Employment 0.61 0.90 0.90 0.90
Exports 0.38 0.84 0.90 0.90
Imports 0.79 0.64 0.63 0.63
NX −0.43 −0.21 −0.17 −0.16
ToTs −0.06 0.46 0.46 0.46
Persistence
GDP 0.60 0.46 0.47 0.47
Investment 0.65 0.28 0.32 0.32
Consumption 0.68 0.58 0.57 0.57
Employment 0.57 0.36 0.38 0.38
Exports 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.56
Imports 0.50 0.56 0.56 0.56
NX 0.57 0.32 0.41 0.42
ToTs 0.45 0.60 0.57 0.57
Notes: Data: Averages over Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and US. All statistics from model simulations are 
averages from 500 simulations of the economy over 100 years. All data are in logs except for net-exports (NX) and HP(100)-ﬁltered. Net-exports are relative 
to output.
The average relative distance,  , in the coeﬃcients for the laws of motion is 0.72%, which suggests that the aggregate 
behavior of the two models is fairly similar. In fact, the effects of microeconomic ﬁxed adjustment costs, when looking at 
aggregate dynamics, are almost indistinguishable from our quadratic adjustment cost speciﬁcation in Table 2. Fig. 1 puts this 
in a graphical version and displays the demeaned time series of investment for the same draw of aggregate productivity 
shocks for both the quadratic cost model and the ﬁxed adjustment cost model calibrated to investment at the micro level.12
The investment series of the quadratic cost model (partial adjustment) and the ﬁxed cost model perfectly align. More 
technically, one could say that we ﬁnd “approximate representation” beyond “approximate aggregation” in the sense of 
Krusell and Smith (1998).13
6.2. The role of capital reallocation
Given the strong difference in results for the open economy compared to the closed economy studied in Khan and 
Thomas (2008), we explore where the difference comes from. First, we look at the model where we either turn off the 
world wide or the differential TFP shock. Second, we investigate the effect of changing the openness parameter, ω.
12 Both series slightly differ in their respective means, because the stochastic costs of capital reallocation introduce a precautionary motive into the 
aggregate investment decision in the ﬁxed cost model. Meanwhile, we account for ﬁrm heterogeneity only implicitly in the quadratic cost model by 
simulating one ﬁrm whose TFP is adjusted upwards to account for higher overall productivity due to log-normally distributed idiosyncratic productivi-
ties.
13 Bachmann et al. (2013) documented in their closed-economy ﬁxed adjustment-cost model that further information about higher moments of the 
capital-stock distribution might be necessary to predict aggregate investment well, despite aggregate capital stocks being well predicted by ﬁrst moments 
alone. In our model, we ﬁnd that a simple log-linear rule in productivity and capital stocks explains not only the evolution of the capital stocks, but also 
the aggregate investment rate relatively well (R2 being roughly 90% for the latter and above 99.9% for the former). Higher-order cross-sectional moments 
add virtually no information in either regression. Lags of productivity and capital add some additional explanatory power for investment, increasing R2 to 
94% and this is different to the quadratic adjustment cost model, where they do not increase the precision of the investment rate forecast. We think that 
these differences are too subtle to allow to discriminate the two models with aggregate data alone. Important for the precision of our numerical solution 
is that this all does not pose any serious issue as aggregate investment is neither a state variable of the ﬁrm’s decision problem nor has per se any impact 
on prices (only through changing the capital stock). The important R2 statistic for the Krusell and Smith rules are therefore on capital and these are always 
above 99.9%, also the den Haan-statistics provide no evidence of the solution being imprecise, see Appendix E.1.
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adjustment cost model and a matched quadratic adjustment cost speciﬁcation simulated over the same draw of aggregate productivities. Both series have 
been demeaned.
Table 3
Cyclical properties: only common vs. only differential shocks.
σ 2diff = 0 σ 2world = 0
ξ¯ = 0 ξ¯ = 0.2 ξ¯ = 0 ξ¯ = 0.2
Standard deviations in %
GDP 1.31 1.30 0.74 0.71
Standard deviation relative to GDP
Investment 2.59 2.52 5.84 5.17
Consumption 0.67 0.68 0.33 0.34
Employment 0.39 0.37 0.70 0.68
Exports 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.04
Imports 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.04
Net exports 0.00 0.01 0.52 0.44
ToTs 0.04 0.04 1.63 1.68
Inv.-vola. decrease 2.71% 13.12%
Quadratic cost ﬁt  0.28% 6.43%
Notes: All statistics from model simulations are averages from 500 simulations of the economy over 100 years. All data are in logs except for net-exports 
and HP(100)-ﬁltered. Net-exports are relative to GDP. All parameters are as in baseline unless stated otherwise.
6.2.1. Worldwide vs. differential TFP shocks
To analyze the model behavior with only worldwide TFP shocks, σˆνdiff is set to zero; to analyze the model with only 
differential TFP shocks, σˆνworld is set to zero.
14 For σˆνdiff = 0, we obtain Khan and Thomas’ (2008) “irrelevance” result 
also for our calibration: Fixed adjustment costs do hardly alter the aggregate dynamics of the model. By contrast, the 
no-worldwide-shocks version exhibits a substantially dampened investment volatility when ﬁxed costs are present, which 
shows that ﬁxed adjustment costs primarily have an impact on capital reallocation between the two countries; see Ta-
ble 3.
6.2.2. Openness
A second way to look at the role of capital reallocation is to look at variations in the openness parameter. The closer 
ω is to 1, the more closed are our two economies to trade. We solve our model for values of the openness parameter, ω, 
ranging from 0.55 to 0.9. Table 4 displays the volatility of investment relative to output for different parameter values for a 
frictionless economy and compares it to one with non-convex adjustment costs of ξ = 0.2.
14 Strictly speaking, we set the respective variance to very low values in order to still be able to estimate the complete laws of motion for the Krusell–
Smith algorithm.
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Investment volatility relative to output for different openness parameter values.
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
Frictionless 3.56 3.67 3.59 3.38 3.15
ξ = 0.2 2.98 3.15 3.25 3.16 3.01
Percentage difference 19.64% 16.54% 10.59% 6.89% 4.62%
Notes: All other parameters are kept at their baseline value.
Fig. 2. Quadratic adjustment cost estimates for different values of ω. Notes: The ﬁgure displays estimates of quadratic capital adjustment costs for different 
values of the home bias parameter ω and for a broad range of ﬁxed adjustment cost speciﬁcations ξ . We obtained estimates of the quadratic adjustment 
cost parameter φ by minimizing the distance between the laws of motion of the capital stocks for the ﬁxed and quadratic cost model.
Clearly, the effect of ﬁxed adjustment costs on investment volatility is stronger, the more open an economy is to trade.15
Vice versa, at ω = 0.9 the effect has weakened substantially. The closed economy setting of Khan and Thomas (2008)
then obtains as a limiting case. When our economies are completely closed to trade, ﬁxed adjustment costs once again 
wash out when looking at aggregate statistics. Interestingly, when we calibrate a quadratic adjustment costs model by 
minimizing (17), the matched levels of quadratic adjustment costs are affected by the degree of openness; see Fig. 2.
6.3. Robustness: adjustment cost distributions
Finally, we check the robustness of our results with respect to the adjustment cost distributions we assume. The sec-
ond column in Table 5 presents the results for a calibration of our model where we follow Khan and Thomas (2008) and 
assume that investments below 1.1% of a ﬁrm’s capital stock are exempt from adjustment costs. This neither alters the 
calibrated adjustment costs nor substantially changes the aggregate model behavior. The third column replaces the uniform 
adjustment cost distribution by a Beta distribution to better match also the kurtosis of investment rates. More speciﬁcally, 
we assume that ξ is generated by ξ¯ ε, where ε comes from a symmetric Beta distribution, B(β¯, β¯), which nests the uniform 
distribution case for β¯ = 1 and non-stochastic adjustment costs for β¯ → ∞. Of course, adjustment costs are again calibrated 
to match the skewness and kurtosis of investment rates. While we ﬁnd that almost non-stochastic adjustment costs match 
the cross-sectional distribution slightly better, both variations have no qualitative impact on our results: ﬁxed adjustment 
costs dampen the aggregate volatility of the model, they reduce excess investment volatility, and they can be represented 
by quadratic adjustment costs – the aggregate laws of motion are still virtually indistinguishable as the average difference 
15 Interestingly we ﬁnd that the dampening effect is non-linear in openness. The likely reason for this lies in the following: Consider a social planner 
in the frictionless open economy model. She has two motives for accumulating capital in the more productive economy. The ﬁrst reason is production 
eﬃciency. When one economy becomes more productive, the marginal return to capital goes up in this economy and capital has to ﬂow in to equilibrate 
marginal productivities in the two economies. This effect is stronger if the economies have less home-bias, as the market for the intermediate goods is 
thicker then. The second reason is more subtle. When one economy becomes more productive, the ﬁnal-goods price falls if there is home bias, because 
more of that country’s intermediate goods are produced. Yet, this implies via consumption smoothing higher consumption of the ﬁnal good in this economy 
also in the future. Capital accumulation in local ﬁnal goods achieves this. This effect is stronger, if the economies have more home bias. The non-linearity 
hence shows that the capital adjustment costs are relatively large in comparison to the production eﬃciency argument but relatively small compared to 
the intertemporal smoothing argument.
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Cyclical properties: robustness to adjustment cost distributions.
Free small adjustment Beta-distributed adjustment cost Free small adjustment 
+ low curvature
Standard deviations in %
GDP 1.47 1.47 1.64
Standard deviation relative to GDP
Investment 3.22 3.37 3.55
Consumption 0.62 0.62 0.56
Employment 0.45 0.46 0.50
Exports 1.01 1.01 0.97
Imports 1.01 1.02 0.97
Net exports 0.20 0.22 0.20
ToTs 0.82 0.82 0.77
Inv.-vola. decrease 10.25% 6.19% 12.82%
Quadratic cost ﬁt  0.38% 0.61% 2.41%
Notes: All statistics from model simulations are averages from 500 simulations of the economy over 100 years. All data are in logs except for net-exports 
and HP(100)-ﬁltered. Net-exports are relative to GDP. All parameters are as in baseline unless stated otherwise. Low curvature refers to a calibration where 
ν = 0.64 and θ = 0.256 such that the semi-reduced production function becomes y = k0.71(zˆ)2.78(w/.64)−1.78. Adjustment costs are recalibrated.
in coeﬃcients is 1%. In the last column of Table 5, we also take the production function parameters as in Khan and Thomas
(2008) and only stick to the higher proﬁtability uncertainty taken from the micro data in Bachmann and Bayer (2014). 
We still ﬁnd approximate representation and the dampening effect turn out to be even slightly larger than in our baseline. 
This might be surprising, since Bachmann et al. (2013) report for Khan and Thomas’ calibration that even in partial equi-
librium, there is fairly little smoothing of aggregate investment, see also Gourio and Kashyap (2007). However, we obtain 
calibrated adjustment costs (using our somewhat different calibration strategy) that are substantially larger than in Khan 
and Thomas (2008).
7. “Fundamentalness” of quadratic capital adjustment costs
The above results taken together suggest that, in the aggregate, quadratic costs provide a reasonable approximation to 
the dynamics of the more complicated underlying heterogeneous ﬁrm ﬁxed adjustment cost model for a range of applica-
tions. Versions of the representative agent model estimated only on aggregate data will thus not be rejected even if our 
lumpy investment model was the data-generating process. More important, to the researcher who is interested in matching 
aggregate dynamics only, quadratic costs provide an easily manageable tool and an additional degree of freedom. She may 
scale investment responses to productivity innovations without missing the aggregate dynamics implied by more detailed 
microeconomic foundations.
However, this ﬁnding only implies that the quadratic costs to capital adjustment provide a good statistical aggregate 
representation of a model that realistically models the ﬁrm’s microeconomic investment problem. Since there is widespread 
evidence that the dominant adjustment costs at the plant or ﬁrm level are non-convex and not quadratic (see Cooper 
and Haltiwanger, 2006), estimated versions of quadratic cost models risk being subject to the Lucas critique in the sense 
that their cost parameter lacks fundamentalness with respect to changes in policy and other deep parameters. Indeed, the 
in-openness-changing quadratic-cost match casts doubt on estimated quadratic adjustment costs being “structural” in this 
sense and model predictions may be invalidated since the quadratic-cost macro model describes the microeconomic decision 
problem that differs from the “true” one.
To investigate this issue more, we further vary key non-adjustment cost parameters of the model (that have a strong 
inﬂuence on the dynamics of aggregate investment in the model) and ask whether the matched quadratic adjustment costs 
change. To this end, we carry out two more experiments. The experiments are designed not to change the model structure 
but only the model parameters. Each of these experiments has a policy interpretation, some of which may be not perfect, 
but this imperfect interpretation comes at the advantage of a minimal intervention.
Already the variations in openness, ω, we looked at in the previous section can be thought of in terms of such experi-
ment as an introduction (removal) of tariffs or other trade barriers. Next, we investigate changes in the mark-up, η, which 
can be thought of as the result of competition policy. Last, we vary idiosyncratic risk, σ . While this last experiment does 
not have a very clear policy analogue, it is closely related to the recent literature on time-varying uncertainty (see, e.g., 
Bloom, 2009 or Bachmann and Bayer, 2013). It also helps to better understand the stronger results that we obtain with 
respect to the “fundamentalness” of quadratic adjustment costs in the last two than in the openness experiment.16
The strategy used for these experiments is to ﬁnd for every change in model parameters a quadratic cost parameter 
that minimizes the expression in (17). We report estimates of matched quadratic costs and minimized distances for all 
experiments in Appendix D. We ﬁnd that the parameters related to the extensive–intensive margin trade-off in a ﬁrm’s 
16 We also experimented with the introduction of an investment tax credit. Results are reported in Appendix A.
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for the ﬁxed and quadratic cost model.
investment decision have an even stronger effect on the matched quadratic adjustment costs than openness. Both the 
curvature of the production function (which in our case is pinned down by η) and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks 
are key for this trade-off. Gourio and Kashyap (2007) show that the capital elasticity of revenues, i.e. the curvature of the 
reduced form revenue function, is central in determining the effect of non-convex adjustment costs.
The intuition for their ﬁnding can be grasped from thinking about the problem from a social planner’s perspective. 
The planner chooses sequences of capital distributions (and labor) in order to maximize utility from consumption and 
leisure. Fixed adjustment costs imply a trade-off for the social planner between paying high adjustment costs to have ﬁrms 
adjusting frequently or accepting ineﬃciency from having equally productive ﬁrms employing different levels of capital. The 
social costs of aggregate capital adjustments are obtained as the minimum loss a social planner achieves trading off the 
costs of higher adjustment frequencies with more ineﬃcient distributions of capital over production units.
This trade-off is absent in the quadratic cost model. Hence, anything that affects its severity has to be captured by the 
size of φ. The eﬃciency costs of unequal capital stocks depend on the capital-elasticity of revenues and are largest around 
an elasticity of 1/2. Consequently, the social planner accepts larger capital dispersions for lower η and lets ﬁrms adjust less 
frequently. For the same reason, the social planner uses more the intensive margin of adjusters to accommodate aggregate 
shocks. A similar line of argument applies to variations in productivity uncertainty σε . Higher σε implies more diverse 
capital stocks for equally productive ﬁrms if the frequency of adjustment is kept constant.
In fact, once we vary the mark-up η or uncertainty σε (see Fig. 3) the matched quadratic costs change strongly. 
We consider η ∈ {4/3,5/4,6/5} and reduce the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks by 25% or 50% such that 
σε ∈ {0.0452,0.0679}. The ﬁgure displays the various equivalent levels of φ corresponding to ﬁxed adjustment costs ξ¯ = 0.2. 
As one can see, the equivalent φ depends on the mark-up and is – as expected – decreasing in the revenue elasticity of cap-
ital (i.e. increasing in η) and decreasing in idiosyncratic uncertainty σε . Hence the equivalent φ increases when uncertainty 
decreases. A similar result is found by Berger and Vavra (2010) for price adjustment.17
These results show that it is problematic to interpret the parameters of the representative-ﬁrm model in a deep sense. 
Suppose, for example, a researcher estimates the aggregate representative-ﬁrm model before and after a liberalization of 
intermediate goods markets, such that the market power of single ﬁrms decreases and effectively η decreases. Then this
17 We also experimented with recalibrating ξ¯ as the distribution of micro-investment rates changes with η and σε . Qualitatively we obtained the same 
results.
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a researcher who estimates the representative-ﬁrm model from aggregate data once in turbulent times and then in more 
tranquil ones, when σε is small, would be led to the (false) conclusion that capital adjustment costs have increased. The 
difference also in terms of implied investment volatility can be substantial, with differences of up to 10% between the ﬁxed 
adjustment cost model and the quadratic cost model that holds φ constant while varying η or σε; see Appendix B.
8. Conclusions
Chang et al. (2010) have pointed out that in many macroeconomic models where aggregate dynamics are represented 
as the decisions of a representative agent, insuﬃcient care is applied when explicitly aggregating across potentially hetero-
geneous microeconomic units. We take this criticism seriously and apply it to the context of two-country open economy 
models. In that literature, the problem of excess volatility in national investment dynamics is widespread and has usually 
been addressed by the introduction of quadratic costs to capital adjustment at the level of a representative ﬁrm.
However, this speciﬁcation contrasts state-of-the art investment modeling, where much of the literature on plant-level 
investment dynamics in the last two decades has highlighted ﬁxed costs or other non-convex costs to capital adjustment 
as the dominant investment friction. These non-convex cost models have proven able to reproduce salient features of 
plant-level investment behavior: long time-spans of virtual inactivity interspersed by occasional outbreaks of large and con-
centrated adjustments of the capital stock, non-Gaussian cross-sectional investment distributions and low serial correlation 
of micro-level investment rates. How this behavior affects aggregation is a priori not clear.
In this paper we have solved a relatively standard two-country real business cycle model of differentiated goods where 
ﬁrms face idiosyncratic productivity risk and stochastic ﬁxed costs to capital adjustment. We demonstrate that this cost 
speciﬁcation matters for shaping aggregate dynamics. The smoothing effect of ﬁxed adjustment costs is the stronger, the 
more open an economy is to trade and the irrelevance result of Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) obtains as a limiting case 
of no openness to trade. Second, our model serves to rationalize the assumption of convex costs to capital adjustment in a 
representative-ﬁrm setting, since the aggregate effects of non-convex adjustment costs turn out to be indistinguishable from 
a quadratic cost setting. Yet, we question whether the representative agent quadratic adjustment costs model is a suitable 
economic approximation. The size of the quadratic adjustment costs in such stand-in representative ﬁrm model co-depends 
on parameters other than adjustment costs, in particular, those regarding the production side (revenue elasticity of capital 
and productivity heterogeneity).
Appendix A. An investment tax credit
As a further “experiment” in understanding the fundamentalness of the representative ﬁrm quadratic cost model, we in-
troduce an investment tax credit (ITC). While the variations in openness can be viewed as a trade liberalization policy, the 
ITC can be viewed as an active trade policy. We assume that in country H there is an ad valorem subsidy τinv on buying 
investment goods, so that the effective price for the investment good decreases and (12d) in the ﬁrm’s problem becomes:
V adjH = −(1− τinv)iH (τ ,CH ) + βE
[
V¯ H (
′,k′; zˆ′,m′)]
However, to render the problem more interesting, we assume that the policy is stochastic. We model the tax policy state as 
a Markov chain with state vector [ 0 τinv ] and transition matrix tax:
tax =
[
0.945 0.055
0.5 0.5
]
The country applies the subsidy 10% of the time and once the policy is in place its expected duration is 2 years. We also 
run a second experiment, where the probability of the tax regime is correlated with the relative TFP, where we set
tax =
[
0.97 0.03
0.5 0.5
]
when relative TFP is positive and
tax =
[
0.9 0.1
0.5 0.5
]
when it is negative.
Under the policy, ﬁrms in country H pay less for investment goods. The subsidy is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax levied on 
all households (through risk-sharing also effectively on country F households).18
18 Technically this means that we can simply distort the ﬁrm’s decision problem and leave all other equilibrium constraints, in particular, the goods 
market clearing condition, unchanged. Of course, this introduces an additional aggregate state to the problem and makes the ﬁrm problems asymmetric 
across countries. Consequently, the KS-rules need to be adjusted and, since the policy only applies to one country, need to accommodate the asymmetric 
setting now where we can no longer expect small variations in the world stock of capital.
140 C. Bayer, V. Tjaden / Review of Economic Dynamics 21 (2016) 125–146Fig. A.1. Levels of φ corresponding ξ¯ = 0.2 for various sizes of ITC, τinv . Notes: The ﬁgures display estimates of matched quadratic adjustment costs after 
introducing a stochastic investment tax credit (ITC) in country H into the model environment. One bar corresponds to one value of the investment tax 
credit τinv . Estimates of the quadratic adjustment cost parameter φ were obtained by minimizing the distance between the laws of motion of the capital 
stocks for the ﬁxed and quadratic cost model. The left panel refers to an investment tax credit that is uncorrelated with TFP and the right panel to a 
tax-credit that has a higher likelihood to be in place in low relative TFP times.
Fig. A.1 displays the results for the quadratic-cost match for this experiment. While the introduction of an investment 
tax credit has a substantial impact on the business cycle statistics (output and even more so investment volatility go 
up, consumption becomes less pro-cyclical), the impact on the size of the matched quadratic adjustment costs is minor, 
so that we can view the representative-ﬁrm quadratic-adjustment-cost model as a quasi “fundamental” stand-in for the 
heterogeneous-ﬁrm ﬁxed-adjustment-cost model.
Appendix B. Quantitative importance of the deviations from fundamentalness
In the main text, we have shown that the matched quadratic adjustment costs change substantially when we alter 
idiosyncratic proﬁtability variance or mark-up. A different metric is the implied investment volatility. As discussed, one can 
also consider the mark-up experiment as an example of a policy, as changes in η can result from a competition policy. 
Suppose, now, that a researcher studies the effect of such a policy on the business cycle behavior of the economy, but takes 
the stand-in representative-ﬁrm model calibrated to aggregate data for the status quo-ante of the reform. Assume the data 
are generated from our model with ﬁxed adjustment costs and η = 4/3. Then assume that the researcher uses the quadratic 
cost model to predict the macroeconomic implications of the policy change. According to our previous ﬁndings, he should 
have decreased the stand-in quadratic adjustment costs, φ, as a result of the change in η. If the researcher fails to do so, 
this representative-ﬁrm model under-predicts investment ﬂuctuations.
Fig. A.2 shows that the error can be sizable and close to 10% for the examples studied. The ﬁgure displays the relative 
difference of the investment volatility of the ﬁxed adjustment-cost model to the quadratic adjustment cost model, keeping 
φ at its value obtained as the stand-in quadratic adjustment costs for our baseline speciﬁcation, φ = 0.155. Changes in 
uncertainty have a very similar effect; again, see Fig. A.2.
Appendix C. Calibrating convex adjustment costs
The investment adjustment cost parameter ξ of our baseline speciﬁcation was chosen to match a cross-sectional invest-
ment rate skewness of 2.19 and kurtosis of 20.03, which Bachmann and Bayer (2013, 2014) ﬁnd in ﬁrm-level data. As in 
that paper, we choose ξ¯ in order to minimize the precision weighted Euclidean distance(
skew(ξ¯ ) − 2.19)2 +(kurt(ξ¯ ) − 20.03)2 ,
0.696 5.506
C. Bayer, V. Tjaden / Review of Economic Dynamics 21 (2016) 125–146 141Fig. A.2. Relative deviations in investment volatility when keeping φ constant. Notes: The ﬁgure shows prediction errors in investment volatility from the 
quadratic adjustment cost model relative to the underlying ﬁxed adjustment cost model when varying “supply side” parameters. In panel (a) the mark-up 
parameter η changes and panel (b) varies idiosyncratic uncertainty. Quadratic adjustment costs are always kept at their baseline estimate of 0.155.
Table A.1
Annual plant-level statistics.
η 1.33 1.25 1.2
ξ 0 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.5 1 0.2 0.2
Mean fraction of adjusters 0.99 0.34 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.11
Std. of fraction of adjusters 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment rate skewness 0.01 1.08 1.90 2.33 2.59 2.78 2.92 3.38 3.83 2.67 2.55
Investment rate kurtosis 3.90 5.43 8.37 10.17 11.37 12.28 13.02 15.51 18.37 12.97 13.79
Mean fraction of spike adjusters 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08
Std. fraction of spike adjusters 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean av. spike adjustments 0.68 0.65 0.81 0.89 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.12 1.23 1.12 1.22
Std. of av. spike adjustments 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adj. costs paid/annual output 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.38 0.15 0.18
Adj. costs paid/annual wages 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.34 0.61 0.20 0.21
Notes: Results are means from 49 simulations over 100 years. The stationary productivity distribution for plants is imposed exactly. An adjusting plant 
is a plant that at least once within a given year chooses to not let its capital stock depreciate but to invest. A plant is counted as a spike adjuster if its 
investment rate it0.5(kt+1−kt ) exceeds 0.2.
where the denominator reﬂects the precision of the higher-order moment estimate. Table A.1 displays a number of statistics 
for our baseline calibration that summarize annual plant-level investment behavior as a function of investment adjustment 
costs. We always calculate gross annual investment for a plant, simulating a cross-section of 6000 plants. As a spike adjuster, 
we qualify a plant whose annual gross investment rate exceeds 20% ( it0.5(kt+1−kt ) > 0.2). Mean average spike adjustment 
refers to mean capital stock growth conditional on the adjustment being counted as a spike. Finally, we calculate the 
average cost that ﬁrms have to bear from realized adjustments as a fraction of their annual output and wage bill.
Appendix D. Matching convex to non-convex adjustment costs
We minimize the Euclidean distance between the log-linear law of motion of relative capital stocks in a non-convex and 
a convex adjustment cost setting as described in the paper. Table A.2 provides the resulting parameter matches and the 
minimized distance measure.
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Parameter matches and minimal distances  .
Variations in openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
φ  φ  φ  φ  φ 
ξ = 0.01 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002
ξ = 0.05 0.048 0.017 0.048 0.011 0.052 0.007 0.055 0.004 0.062 0.003
ξ = 0.10 0.085 0.015 0.085 0.011 0.098 0.007 0.110 0.006 0.120 0.004
ξ = 0.15 0.107 0.013 0.115 0.010 0.130 0.007 0.143 0.006 0.163 0.004
ξ = 0.20 0.130 0.011 0.140 0.009 0.155 0.007 0.170 0.006 0.195 0.005
ξ = 0.25 0.155 0.010 0.165 0.008 0.185 0.007 0.205 0.005 0.220 0.004
ξ = 0.50 0.255 0.009 0.265 0.008 0.282 0.007 0.315 0.005 0.333 0.004
ξ = 1.00 0.420 0.013 0.435 0.011 0.450 0.008 0.487 0.006 0.500 0.004
Investment tax credit
Uncorrelated Correlated
φ  φ 
τinv = 0.01 0.092 0.009 0.115 0.008
τinv = 0.03 0.103 0.005 0.147 0.006
τinv = 0.05 0.120 0.005 0.135 0.008
Mark-up variations
φ 
1
η = 0.80 0.052 0.013
1
η = 0.83 0.028 0.002
Variations in plant uncertainty
φ 
σ = 0.07 0.258 0.019
σ = 0.05 0.393 0.008
Notes: The table reports quadratic adjustment cost estimates φ and corresponding minimized distances ψ for all model speciﬁcations presented in the 
paper. In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty, openness (ω) is ﬁxed at its baseline value 
of 0.7.
Appendix E. Numerical solution method
In order to numerically solve our model, we need to accurately approximate the laws of motion of the two cross-
sectional distributions over capital and idiosyncratic productivity states in both countries. Given that our value function is 
of dimension 3 + 2n where n ∈Rn is the number of moments by which we approximate μH and μF , we are limited in the 
number of moments for approximation. Another challenge is the simultaneous solution for the two prices τ and λ during 
the simulation step.
E.1. Accuracy of the approximating laws of motion
Fortunately, we ﬁnd that, as in related papers, it is suﬃcient to approximate the cross-sectional distributions by their 
ﬁrst moments over capital in order to forecast prices judging by all standard measures for accuracy. We use the following 
general log-linear forms for the aggregate laws of motion:[
log(kH ) + log(kF )
]= αw0 + αw1 [log(kH ) + log(kF )]+ αw2 log(zˆ) + αw3 τinv (18a)[
log(kH ) − log(kF )
]= α0 + α1 [log(kH ) − log(kF )]+ α2 log(zˆ) + α3 τinv (18b)
log(H ) = α0 + α1 log(kH ) + α2 log(kF ) + α3 log(zˆ) + α4 τinv (18c)
log(τ ) = ατ0 + ατ1
[
log(kH ) − log(kF )
]+ ατ2 log(zˆ) + ατ3 τinv (18d)
For all model versions (including our baseline) where there is no investment tax credit αw3 , α

3 , α

3 and α
τ
3 are obviously 
restricted to zero. One can view the laws of motion for world capital and capital differences as rotated versions of laws of 
motion for capital in each national economy. Also, for those variants theory predicts that such forecasting rules for each 
national economy should be symmetric, as the economies we model are symmetric. For our rotated rules, this symmetry 
with respect to the individual stocks of capital implies the following additional restrictions:
1. αw2 = 0
2. α0 = 0
3. ατ0 = 0
Tables A.3 to A.7 report the parameter estimates that solve the Krusell–Smith algorithm for the model parameterizations 
that we consider in our paper. Note that forecast error variance is generally very low and that in our baseline calibration 
the minimum R2 for all regression results is 99.99%.
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Krusell–Smith rules for [log(kH ) + log(kF )]′ .
Variations in openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
αw0 α
w
k α
w
z α
w
0 α
w
k α
w
z α
w
0 α
w
k α
w
z α
w
0 α
w
k α
w
z α
w
0 α
w
k α
w
z
ξ = 0.01 0.20 0.78 0.65 0.20 0.78 0.65 0.20 0.78 0.66 0.20 0.77 0.66 0.21 0.77 0.66
ξ = 0.05 0.20 0.78 0.64 0.20 0.78 0.64 0.20 0.78 0.64 0.20 0.78 0.65 0.20 0.78 0.65
ξ = 0.10 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.78 0.64 0.19 0.78 0.64 0.19 0.78 0.64
ξ = 0.15 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63
ξ = 0.20 0.18 0.79 0.63 0.18 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.79 0.63
ξ = 0.25 0.18 0.79 0.62 0.18 0.79 0.62 0.18 0.79 0.62 0.18 0.79 0.62 0.18 0.79 0.62
ξ = 0.50 0.17 0.80 0.61 0.17 0.80 0.61 0.17 0.80 0.61 0.18 0.79 0.61 0.18 0.79 0.61
ξ = 1.00 0.16 0.80 0.59 0.16 0.80 0.59 0.16 0.80 0.59 0.16 0.80 0.59 0.17 0.80 0.59
Investment tax credit
Uncorrelated Correlated
αw0 α
w
k α
w
z α
w
3 α
w
0 α
w
k α
w
z α
w
3
τinv = 0.01 0.19 0.79 0.63 0.01 0.19 0.79 0.62 0.01
τinv = 0.03 0.19 0.79 0.62 0.02 0.19 0.78 0.60 0.02
τinv = 0.05 0.19 0.79 0.62 0.04 0.20 0.79 0.57 0.04
Mark-up-variations
αw0 α
w
k α
w
z
1
η = 0.80 0.27 0.78 0.64
1
η = 0.83 0.34 0.78 0.64
Variations in plant uncertainty
αw0 α
w
k α
w
z
σ = 0.07 0.13 0.78 0.56
σ = 0.05 0.05 0.83 0.61
Notes: This table reports the Krusell–Smith equilibrium laws of motion for the sum of world log-capital stocks for all model speciﬁcations presented in the 
paper. In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty, openness (ω) is ﬁxed at its baseline value 
of 0.7.
Table A.4
Krusell–Smith rules for [log(kH ) − log(kF )]′ .
Variations in openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
αk α

z α

k α

z α

k α

z α

k α

z α

k α

z
ξ = 0.01 0.17 0.49 0.31 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.56 0.71 0.54
ξ = 0.05 0.26 0.42 0.37 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.54 0.72 0.52
ξ = 0.10 0.31 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.51 0.65 0.52 0.72 0.51
ξ = 0.15 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.56 0.49 0.65 0.51 0.73 0.50
ξ = 0.20 0.36 0.34 0.44 0.41 0.56 0.48 0.66 0.50 0.73 0.50
ξ = 0.25 0.38 0.32 0.45 0.39 0.57 0.47 0.66 0.49 0.73 0.49
ξ = 0.50 0.44 0.27 0.49 0.34 0.59 0.43 0.67 0.46 0.73 0.47
ξ = 1.00 0.51 0.22 0.54 0.29 0.62 0.38 0.68 0.42 0.74 0.44
Investment tax credit
Uncorrelated Correlated
αk α

z α

3 α

k α

z α

3
τinv = 0.01 0.56 0.48 0.03 0.57 0.47 0.03
τinv = 0.03 0.55 0.48 0.08 0.57 0.47 0.08
τinv = 0.05 0.55 0.47 0.14 0.57 0.46 0.14
Mark-up-variations
αk α

z
1
η = 0.80 0.54 0.49
1
η = 0.83 0.53 0.52
Variations in plant uncertainty
αk α

z
σ = 0.07 0.57 0.43
σ = 0.05 0.63 0.46
Notes: This table reports the Krusell–Smith equilibrium laws of motion for differences in log-capital stocks between Home and Foreign for all model 
speciﬁcations presented in the paper. In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty, openness 
(ω) is ﬁxed at its baseline value of 0.7.
As argued by den Haan (2010) very low one-step-ahead prediction errors by themselves are no guarantee for having 
found an accurate description of the aggregate behavior of the economy. We therefore compute an additional measure 
that allows us to assess accuracy over longer forecast horizons. Speciﬁcally, we simulate the economy over a fresh, long 
productivity draw of 5000 periods, calculating market clearing prices and the behavior of the aggregate capital stock exactly. 
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ω = 0.9
α

2 α

3 α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3
−0.09 −0.18 0.55 −0.35 −0.05 −0.23
−0.09 −0.19 0.55 −0.34 −0.05 −0.24
−0.09 −0.19 0.55 −0.34 −0.05 −0.24
−0.09 −0.19 0.55 −0.34 −0.05 −0.24
−0.09 −0.19 0.55 −0.34 −0.05 −0.25
−0.09 −0.19 0.55 −0.34 −0.05 −0.25
−0.09 −0.20 0.55 −0.33 −0.05 −0.26
−0.09 −0.21 0.55 −0.33 −0.05 −0.27Table A.5
Krusell–Smith rules for log(H ).
Variations in openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.8
α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3 α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3 α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3 α

0 α

1
ξ = 0.01 0.55 −0.21 −0.19 −0.04 0.55 −0.23 −0.17 −0.07 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13 0.55 −0.30
ξ = 0.05 0.55 −0.21 −0.19 −0.04 0.55 −0.22 −0.17 −0.07 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13 0.55 −0.30
ξ = 0.10 0.55 −0.20 −0.18 −0.04 0.55 −0.22 −0.17 −0.07 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13 0.55 −0.30
ξ = 0.15 0.55 −0.20 −0.18 −0.04 0.55 −0.22 −0.17 −0.07 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.14 0.55 −0.30
ξ = 0.20 0.55 −0.20 −0.18 −0.04 0.55 −0.22 −0.17 −0.07 0.55 −0.25 −0.13 −0.14 0.55 −0.29
ξ = 0.25 0.55 −0.20 −0.18 −0.04 0.55 −0.22 −0.16 −0.07 0.55 −0.25 −0.13 −0.14 0.55 −0.29
ξ = 0.50 0.55 −0.20 −0.18 −0.04 0.55 −0.21 −0.16 −0.08 0.55 −0.25 −0.13 −0.14 0.55 −0.29
ξ = 1.00 0.55 −0.20 −0.17 −0.04 0.55 −0.21 −0.16 −0.08 0.55 −0.25 −0.13 −0.15 0.55 −0.28
Notes: This table reports the Krusell–Smith equilibrium forecasting rules for H for the variations in openness and ﬁxed adjustment costs.
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Krusell–Smith rules for log(H ) (cont.)
Investment tax credit
Uncorrelated Correlated
α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3 α

4 α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3 α

4
τinv = 0.01 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13 −0.79 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13 −0.79
τinv = 0.03 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.12 −0.78 0.55 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13 −0.80
τinv = 0.05 0.56 −0.26 −0.13 −0.12 −0.78 0.56 −0.27 −0.13 −0.13 −0.81
Mark-up-variations
α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3
1
η = 0.80 0.52 −0.27 −0.13 −0.14
1
η = 0.83 0.49 −0.28 −0.14 −0.14
Variations in plant uncertainty
α

0 α

1 α

2 α

3
σ = 0.07 0.65 −0.26 −0.14 −0.14
σ = 0.05 0.71 −0.22 −0.12 −0.13
Notes: This table reports the Krusell–Smith equilibrium forecasting rules for H for the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and 
plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Table A.7
Krusell–Smith rules for log(τ ).
Variations in openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
ατ0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2
ξ = 0.01 0.25 −0.25 0.77 0.29 −0.29 0.73 0.33 −0.33 0.66 0.35 −0.35 0.61 0.37 −0.37 0.58
ξ = 0.05 0.25 −0.25 0.77 0.28 −0.28 0.74 0.32 −0.32 0.67 0.35 −0.35 0.62 0.37 −0.37 0.60
ξ = 0.10 0.25 −0.25 0.77 0.28 −0.28 0.74 0.32 −0.32 0.68 0.34 −0.34 0.63 0.37 −0.37 0.60
ξ = 0.15 0.24 −0.24 0.78 0.28 −0.28 0.75 0.32 −0.32 0.69 0.34 −0.34 0.64 0.36 −0.36 0.61
ξ = 0.20 0.24 −0.24 0.78 0.27 −0.27 0.75 0.31 −0.31 0.69 0.34 −0.34 0.64 0.36 −0.36 0.62
ξ = 0.25 0.24 −0.24 0.78 0.27 −0.27 0.75 0.31 −0.31 0.69 0.34 −0.34 0.65 0.36 −0.36 0.62
ξ = 0.50 0.24 −0.24 0.78 0.27 −0.27 0.76 0.31 −0.31 0.71 0.33 −0.33 0.66 0.36 −0.36 0.64
ξ = 1.00 0.23 −0.23 0.79 0.26 −0.26 0.77 0.30 −0.30 0.72 0.33 −0.33 0.69 0.35 −0.35 0.66
Investment tax credit
Uncorrelated Correlated
ατ0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
3 α
τ
0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
3
τinv = 0.01 0.32 −0.32 0.69 −0.01 0.31 −0.31 0.69 −0.01
τinv = 0.03 0.32 −0.32 0.69 −0.03 0.31 −0.31 0.69 −0.03
τinv = 0.05 0.32 −0.32 0.69 −0.04 0.32 −0.32 0.69 −0.04
Mark-up-variations
ατ0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2
1
η = 0.80 0.34 −0.34 0.70
1
η = 0.83 0.35 −0.35 0.69
Variations in plant uncertainty
ατ0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2
σ = 0.07 0.31 −0.31 0.70
σ = 0.05 0.29 −0.29 0.70
Notes: This table reports the Krusell–Smith equilibrium forecasting rules for the terms of trade τ for all model speciﬁcations presented in the paper. In the 
experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty, openness (ω) is ﬁxed at its baseline value of 0.7.
We record these capital stocks as a reference and then simulate the time path of the same variables using our estimated 
laws of motion as the data-generating process. Our measure of accuracy is the 99th percentile of percentage deviations 
between the two series. The fact that deviations between the two series are almost always below 1% and for our baseline 
calibration below 0.5% gives us conﬁdence that we have found accurate solutions. Also note that there is no systematic 
relation between either forecast length and percentage error or cyclical position and percentage error, i.e. market clearing 
and forecasting rules do not diverge.
E.2. Simulating the economy
For simulating the economy and obtaining updates for the estimates of our aggregate rules we use the method proposed 
in Young (2010). This means approximating the distribution of ﬁrms over capital and productivity by a histogram over a 
ﬁne but ﬁxed grid and assigning all probability mass in transitions to the grid-points by linearly splitting it up between 
adjacent ones. Every period, the two equilibrium prices are computed exactly using the trust-region-dogleg algorithm of 
MATLAB’s fsolve as described in Coleman and Li (1996) with a termination tolerance on prices of 1E−7. During simulations, 
we use on-grid maximization methods to solve the ﬁrm problems when ﬁnding the root of our market clearing conditions. 
In order to do that, we interpolate value functions to our histogram capital of grid points using the current forecasts from 
the aggregate laws of motion.
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